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Abstract During the past 20 years, there have been several initiatives, led by the 
British government, to improve crime prevention by informing policy and practice 
with research. Two in particular stand out for the scale of the investment: The first 
was the establishment of the Crime Reduction Programme (CRP) in 1999. The CRP 
was supposed both to be based on what was already known from research and also to 
improve the evidence base and was scheduled to run for a decade. The CRP involved 
an unprecedented financial commitment to improving the knowledge base of crime 
prevention. The second was the establishment of the What Works Centre for Crime 
Reduction (WWCCR) in 2013. The WWCCR attempts both to distil findings from 
high quality research on what works in crime reduction in a form that would be read-
ily accessible to and useable by decision-makers, and to encourage original research 
to improve the knowledge base. We touch more briefly also on the creation of the 
National Police Improvement Agency in 2007 and its successor body, the College 
of Policing in 2013. The core mission of both has been to professionalise policing 
(including police efforts to reduce crime) by making policing more evidence based, 
and the College of Policing has been home to WWCCR. This paper will provide a 
critical account of these major efforts to bring evidence to crime reduction and dis-
cuss lessons that can be learned from their experience.
Keywords Crime Reduction Programme · What Works Centre · Evidence-based 
crime reduction · Policing
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Introduction
The first issue of Crime Prevention and Community Safety appeared in 1999. Its 
publication reflected the growing interest in the subject matter in both policy and 
research terms. As Rob Mawby put it in his opening editorial in the first issue:
Crime Prevention and Community Safety: An International Journal is a new 
journal with a refreshingly new philosophy. It is policy-oriented, with a com-
parative and theoretical underpinning which gives it a vitally critical edge. As 
the ‘nothing works’ philosophy of the 1970s and 1980s has gradually given 
way to a renewed optimism, crime prevention has been viewed by many as the 
way forward. While it may, in theory, be true that all criminology implicitly 
addresses crime prevention, in practice criminal justice systems world-wide 
have been geared towards reacting to crime after the event, rather than prevent-
ing it before it occurs. A shift in resources is thus seen as a realistic approach. 
Shifting the emphasis towards prevention, through multi-agency partnerships 
and community involvement, in Britain illustrated most recently through the 
1998 Crime and Disorder Act, is applauded by many as the rediscovery of the 
holy grail. (Mawby 1999: 7)
There has been an avalanche of research relating to crime prevention since the foun-
dation of the journal. Looking at Google Scholar, up until the end of 1998, 206,000 
hits can be found for ‘crime prevention’. From that date until the time of writing 
(27 June 2018) a further 945,000 hits can be found. This gives a rough idea of the 
expansion.
This paper reflects on some targeted efforts to improve the knowledge base in 
the 20 years since the inauguration of the journal. What have we learned over that 
period about major initiatives to foster the creation and use of a research-informed 
knowledge base for crime prevention and community safety?
It is important to acknowledge at the start that much more has been done both 
nationally and internationally than we can discuss in a short article. Our coverage 
is very partial. Crime Prevention and Community Safety has been avowedly inter-
national in its focus. We focus on the UK here. Moreover, even within the UK 
there have been and continue to be diverse initiatives relating to crime prevention 
research, policy and practice.
We focus mainly on two large initiatives that have been taken to try to bring 
research findings and research activity to crime prevention in the past 20  years, 
although we also discuss very briefly two other initiatives that put the second of 
the two major efforts we focus on in context. We have picked the two examples we 
use here in part because they are major and in part also because we were both quite 
heavily involved in them. The upside of this is that we know them well from the 
inside. The downside is that our treatment may be biased. Readers beware!
We first discuss the Crime Reduction Programme. We go on briefly to refer to 
the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) and the College of Policing 
(CoP) as relevant contextual developments. Lastly we look in a little more detail at 
the What Works Centre for Crime Reduction (WWCCR). We conclude with some 
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comments on what might better be done in future to bring strong and relevant evi-
dence to improving the effectiveness of crime prevention policy and practice.
The Crime Reduction Programme
The Home Office Crime Reduction Programme (CRP) was launched in Spring of 
1999 and was expected to run over 10 years, although in the event was terminated in 
March 2002. In 1999, as Fig. 1 shows, crime was already beginning to fall. However, 
at that time what has turned out to be the start of a long-term drop was assumed to 
be a temporary lull, so investment in crime prevention was deemed justifiable.
The CRP was described by Homel et al. (2004) as ‘an evidence-based policy pro-
gramme’ to tackle crime and disorder, and as such was the first of its kind. Its three 
goals were:
1. To achieve a sustained reduction in crime
2. To improve and mainstream knowledge and best practice
3. To maximise the implementation of cost-effective crime reduction activity.
Crime prevention was widely defined to include early intervention, crime in commu-
nities, the work of the police and probation services, sentencing practices, offender 
treatment programmes and imprisonment.
As Maguire (2004) put it,
On the face of it, the Crime Reduction Programme, for which £400 million of 
public money was earmarked….represents the most comprehensive systematic 






















Fig. 1  Trends in CSEW percentages of households/adults who were victims once or more (prevalence 
risks) from year ending December 1981 to year ending December 2017. Note: The British Crime Survey 
(BCS) waves refer to calendar years 1981, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1993, 1995 and 1999 (January–December). 
From 2001, the survey has run annually and figures refer to Apr-Mar. The survey is now called the Crime 
Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) The figures used in this chart are taken from the ONS (Office for 
National Statistics) website and refer to all crimes covered by the surveys, excluding fraud and computer 
misuse
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and far-sighted initiative ever undertaken by a British Government to develop 
strategies for tackling crime. The government also backed up its stated aim 
of promoting ‘evidence-based’ policy and practice by allocating 10 per cent 
of the original budget of £250 million to evaluation undertaken by external 
researchers – an unprecedented amount of research money in the UK crime 
and justice field. (Maguire 2004: 214)
The funding for the programme was made available following an assessment of the 
research evidence at the time of what was known about reducing offending (Gold-
blatt and Lewis 1998) and what more needed to be known. The reported findings 
helped inform the shape and spend of the programme, and accorded with the empha-
sis on widespread responsibility for crime prevention and partnership that had been 
embodied in the Crime and Disorder Act, the Home Office Circulars that preceded it 
and the Five Towns Initiative and Safer Cities Programme (Gilling 1994). The idea 
of the research and innovation aspect of the programme looked sensible: Develop 
promising innovations, trial them with systematic evaluation, abandon those that fail 
to deliver the anticipated benefits, and build on those that achieved success.
By all previous standards for crime prevention, the CRP was a hugely ambitious 
enterprise. It was to include both original research and practice rooted in evidence 
of what had already been found effective. Table 1 shows the allocation across all 20 
streams. By far the largest funding allocation was to CCTV, for which evidence was 
not strong although it was very popular at the time. It accounted for £169 million 
of the projected funding. The research community was excited by the research and 
evaluation aspects of the programme, which by British standards involved excep-
tionally high levels of funding.
In the event, the CRP turned out overall to be a disappointing failure. There are 
numerous accounts of this failure both from commentators involved in one way or 
another with it (for example Hope 2004; Hough 2004; Laycock and Webb 2003; 
Maguire 2004; Raynor 2004; Tilley 2004) and from a commissioned evaluation of 
the programme as a whole (Homel et al. 2004).
As indicated, the programme ended sooner than expected despite initial opti-
mism. Its spend, while it lasted, was also much lower than planned. In Year One £60 
million was allocated, in Year Two £160 million and in Year Three £180 million. 
However, only 13% of the budget was spent in Year One rising to 62% in Year Two 
and 83% in Year Three (Homel et al. 2004: 49).
What went wrong? We note here three main points that emerge from the literature 
on the programme. First, too much was expected from the CRP too soon. It turns out 
(in retrospect unsurprisingly) not to be possible to work out needs based on evidence, 
devise plausible strategies to meet those needs, write coherent proposals, assess them, 
refine them, agree them, recruit the necessary staff with the right skills, put in place 
arrangements for systematic evaluation, set in motion provisions for robust implemen-
tation, run them long enough to secure robust findings, write up the findings and then 
act on them within the projected timescales. It all takes time if done properly. If not 
done properly, waste and disappointment follow. Three years was not long enough. 
Moreover, in retrospect the idea that £60 million could be spent sensibly in the first 
year looks absurd. But the fact that nothing like that amount was spent was frustrating 
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to politicians and policymakers. Second, the research community in Britain lacked the 
capacity to deliver the research side of the programme. The criminological and evalua-
tion communities in the UK were too small to meet the demand and there was not time 
to build capacity. Moreover, results of social science research are seldom unequivocal 
and there are (and were) debates over the methodology to be used and over the robust-
ness of specific findings that were reported. On the whole instant robust research with 
unequivocal findings in social science is rare. Third, agendas move on, new political 
imperatives arise, new ministers arrive and priorities change and the ‘implementation 
failure’ could not be tolerated. The Crime Reduction Programme was lost.
It would be remiss not to acknowledge some achievements. While it is the case 
that some good research providing useful findings came out of the programme, there 
was not a large volume of it. Stanko (2004), for example, reports as one example, 
research that was funded towards the end of the programme and that was not so 
much about testing interventions to find out what worked in reducing hate crime and 
domestic violence, but rather focused on evidence about attributes of those types of 
offence that could be drawn on in working out what to do.
The National Policing Improvement Agency and College of Policing
The NPIA was set up following the Police and Justice Act 2006 and came into exist-
ence on 1 April 2007. Its abolition came with the Crime and Courts Act of 2013.
One of NPIA’s roles had been that of identifying, developing and promulgating 
good practice in policing. Much of this was later transferred to CoP. Specifically, 
CoP, which was also established in 2013, took over the training and development 
roles that had been within the remit of NPIA. This has been understood to include 
the use of research to develop an evidence-based approach to policing.
The CoP website refers to three complementary functions (http://www.colle 
ge.polic e.uk/About /Pages /defau lt.aspx, accessed 23 June 2018):
• ‘Knowledge—we develop the research and infrastructure for improving evidence 
of “what works”. Over time, we will ensure that policing practice and standards 
are based on knowledge, rather than custom and convention.
• Education—we support the development of individual members of the profes-
sion. We set educational requirements to assure the public of the quality and con-
sistency of policing skills and we facilitate academic accreditation and recogni-
tion of our members’ expertise.
• Standards—we draw on the best available evidence of ‘what works’ to set stand-
ards in policing for forces and individuals…’
CoP itself has been dedicated to professionalising policing in the UK, which 
includes making it more evidence-based. They state on their website that, ‘A fun-
damental development within the College is the use of knowledge and research to 
develop an evidence-based approach to policing’.
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What Works Centre for Crime Reduction
There is as yet little literature explaining the What Works Centre for Crime Reduc-
tion and its associated research programme, so we describe them here in some detail.
The What Works Centre for Crime Reduction (WWCCR) was established in 2013 
and lodged in the College of Policing. It was one of five early What Works Centres 
that had been set up following a Cabinet Office initiative. These centres focused on 
Education, Local Growth, Health and Social Care, and Early Intervention as well as 
Crime Reduction. By 2018, there were five more What Works Centres: three cov-
ered new areas—Wellbeing, Ageing, and Children’s Social Care, and the remaining 
two related specifically to Scotland and Wales. The idea of the What Works Centres 
was to help decision-makers come to better decisions in cost-effectiveness terms. 
The risk of allocating resources to ineffective or counterproductive measures or less 
efficient methods than others, to achieve given objectives, could be reduced by brig-
ading the most robust evidence available on what works.
The What Works Centres began by prioritising randomised controlled trials 
(RCTs) as the key method for discovering what works. Looking across the findings 
of studies that met the exacting standards of RCTs and synthesising them promised 
a route to cataloguing the effectiveness of interventions that might be considered by 
decision-makers. This approach was informed by the long-standing National Insti-
tute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), which was deemed a success and was 
initially cited as the model on which new Centres should be based. The focus on 
RCTs on which NICE guidelines had been built was heavily influenced by the huge 
numbers of drug trials paid for by the pharmaceutical companies. It was not neces-
sarily the most appropriate methodology for the new Centres and in any case NICE 
had long since broadened its criteria for assessing what works. Current guidance 
from the Cabinet Office states that:
Though we still have a long way to go, the What Works approach, and the 
more robust methods on which it is founded – such as the use of randomised 
controlled trials (RCTs) and the more systematic analysis of what is working 
where, and why – is rapidly becoming the new normal. (Halpern 2018)
Soon after the WWCCR was established and based in the CoP, the Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC) and CoP funded the “What Works Commissioned 
Partnership Programme: ‘University Consortium for Evidence-based Crime Reduc-
tion’”, the start date of which was 1 September 2013. The grant ran initially till 31 
August 2016 but an extension and supplementary grant meant that it was not fin-
ished until 31 March 2018. The amount spent ran to over £3.2 million, a small frac-
tion of what had been spent on the Crime Reduction Programme, but still substantial 
by social science standards.
The consortium was led by UCL, but also included Birkbeck College, Cardiff 
University, the Universities of Dundee, Glasgow, Southampton and Surrey, The 
Institute of Education (later incorporated into UCL) and The London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. There were nine ‘Work Packages’ (WPs), as shown 
in Table 2.
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WP1 involved an exhaustive and international search of the literature for sys-
tematic reviews, where the term systematic refers both to the systematic search for 
studies that meet minimum methodological standards and the use of standards that 
meet or approach those of RCTs. This prioritised studies that avoid bias and which 
achieve internal validity. Bias can occur where data are collected or interpreted 
selectively (even if that selection is unconscious). It is typically achieved by random 
assignment (rather than selecting the most promising cases for treatment) and by 
blinding the providers, receivers and data analysts as to membership of the treat-
ment and control groups. Internal validity is achieved when alternative explanations 
for change are ruled out, ideally by randomising allocation to treatment and non-
treatment groups to ensure that only exposure to the treatment in the one group can 
account for any observed difference in outcome between groups.
WP2 involved 12 fresh systematic reviews focusing on interventions that were 
missing or ripe for review according to WP1, and agreed with the College of Polic-
ing, but using a combination of the Campbell Collaboration approach which pri-
oritises RCTs and their close cousins and a realist approach which is concerned 
with how and where initiatives might work, and amongst whom (Pawson and Tilley 
1997; Pawson 2006).
WP3 created a scheme to code findings for types of evidence that would be use-
ful for decision-makers drawing on research that could improve what they do. This 
embraced the concerns over robust and unbiased estimates of effect size that are 
aimed for in RCTs, but included evidence that speaks to other factors that decision-
makers need to consider in coming to sensible conclusions. These other factors 
included the mechanisms through which interventions produced intended and unin-
tended effects, the contextual conditions for the activation of mechanisms generating 
the outcome patterns, findings relating to the implementation challenges for putting 
the intervention in place, and the economics of the intervention in terms of costs 
and benefits. The acronym EMMIE was used to capture these, EMMIE referring 
Table 2  Work Packages included in the Crime Reduction What Works Commissioned Partnership Pro-
gramme
Work Package Description
1 A comprehensive listing of existing systematic reviews on crime reduction topics, 
mapped by topic area
2 A series of 12 new systematic reviews on key topics carried out over the 3 years of the 
programme
3 A comprehensive labelling scheme, using a consistent evaluation standard, to rate and 
rank the effectiveness of interventions and cost savings
4 Application of the criteria in WP3 to each systematic review
5 Developing guidance for practitioners on costing interventions
6 The design of a police development programme on evidence appraisal for the profession
7 Deliver a pilot of WP6
8 Primary research in light of key gaps and evidence needs
9 Testing the impact of the What Works Centre: An independent evaluation
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to Effects, Mechanisms, Moderators (i.e. context), Implementation and Economics 
(Johnson et al. 2015). The decision maker needs evidence relating to all of these in 
order to come to an informed view as to whether or not to adopt a given intervention.
In the event, existing reviews identified in WP1 reported relatively little on evi-
dence other than that relating to effects. Moreover, freshly undertaken reviews con-
ducted under WP2 found few individual primary studies that covered all elements 
of EMMIE or suites of studies that reported compelling evidence across the board. 
Adequate economic evaluations were especially rare. A table showing the findings 
for individual reviews, in terms both of coverage adequacy and findings, is located 
at: http://whatw orks.colle ge.polic e.uk/toolk it/Pages /Toolk it.aspx, accessed 23 June 
2018. Further details behind the table can be found by clicking the relevant buttons 
at the same web page.
WP5 produced a book explaining forms of economic analysis (Manning et  al. 
2016) and guidance on how to do them as well as an Excel-based tool (‘The Man-
ning Tool’) for conducting economic analyses, which can be downloaded from 
http://csrm.cass.anu.edu.au/resea rch/proje cts/manni ng-cost-benefi t-tool. This tool 
was designed to support improved economic analyses in the future.
WP6 and WP7 were about training rather than research, but did find the police 
understanding and use of research-based evidence to have been quite weak. WP9 
assessed the impact of the What Works Centre for Crime Reduction and the Com-
missioned Partnership Programme to determine whether they had appropriately 
engaged key stakeholders, produced tools and guidance that stakeholders find clear 
and easy to use, and improved stakeholder understanding and application of evi-
dence. It included a study of changes in police attitudes towards and use of evidence 
between the beginning and end of the programme. It found interest and involvement 
in research to have grown between 2014 and 2017 alongside closer relationships 
with universities, although these could not, of course, be attributed solely to the Col-
lege of Policing in general or the What Works Centre in particular. The changes that 
were identified took place alongside growing numbers of collaborations between 
police services and universities, which had been fostered and supported by the Brit-
ish Home Office and College of Policing.
Whilst the other work packages did not involve primary research to build the 
knowledge base for crime reduction, that was not the case with WP8, some projects 
within which did lead to new knowledge. Those funded for WP8, at Cardiff Uni-
versity, had a fairly open agenda. They proposed projects that were agreed by the 
College of Policing. One project focused on Behavioural Crime Prevention: Using 
Nudges, Tugs and Teachable Moments in Crime Prevention Communications (brief-
ing note available at: https ://stati c1.squar espac e.com/stati c/51b06 364e4 b02de 2f57f 
d72e/t/58d10 5e2b8 a79b6 61789 71da/14900 93541 766/Nudge +BCP+60+Secon 
d+Briefi ng.pdf, accessed 23 June 2018). The project was rooted in the behavioural 
change literature, notably Thaler and Sunstein’s Nudge (2009). This project trialled a 
variety of different communication strategies, through eight films with victimisation 
scenarios based on real-life events varying the sources of the advice (the messen-
ger), the behavioural change trigger being invoked (the mechanism) and the contents 
of the information (the message). The films were shown to 1064 members of the 
public in different combinations, after which members of the audience were asked 
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‘questions about their cognitive, affective and potential behavioural responses to the 
films’ (UPSI 2018, p. 1). The most influential films were found to be those based 
on crime experience, emphasising emotional impact. Moreover, showing was more 
effective than telling. Films making people feel responsible and competent were 
found effective. Traditional messages made some frightened, vulnerable or angry 
and those made angry were unlikely to indicate they would change their behaviour.
These findings were then used to run a field trial at London Underground sta-
tions, where a cartoon cat (‘Copcat’) was used to front a campaign based on the 
earlier findings, to see whether this was more effective than traditional crime pre-
vention campaigns. Observations, street questioning, social media analytics and a 
survey of staff at local businesses were used to find out what people remembered 
from the messages and how they felt about them. Overall recall was similar for tra-
ditional and CopCat campaigns although the CopCat one generated less fear and 
anger. (A brief summary can be found at http://whatw orks.colle ge.polic e.uk/About /
News/Pages /CopCa t.aspx, accessed 27 June 2018.)
What are we to make of the WWCCR and in particular the associated research 
programme as a vehicle for getting research relating to crime prevention into pol-
icy and practice? The work packages, following the ethos of the time, were framed 
around the need for systematic reviews of research evidence, adopting the Campbell 
Collaboration approach, which tends to give primacy to research using particular 
methodologies focussing on internal validity. This necessarily restricts the stud-
ies that are included and the conclusions that can be drawn. However, in the new 
reviews conducted under WP2, it was possible to be far more inclusive: here realist 
synthesis, which draws on studies using diverse research methods, was combined 
with systematic review methods, which prioritise RCTs and their close counterparts 
(see, for example, Sidebottom et al. 2017, 2018). The evidence base drawn on has 
widened yet rigour is still emphasised, and the priority once attached to RCTs has 
softened. WWCCR has played a part in that softening process. Indeed an emerg-
ing What Works Centre for Children’s Social Care looks likely to adopt EMMIE 
and the diverse evidence types drawn on as their framework for sorting and sifting 
what is known. Interestingly for a research contract, the inclusion of two work pack-
ages related to training the police was an important innovation nodding, as it did, to 
implementation threats. Similarly, the requirement to develop a tool for the transla-
tion of the research evidence into a user-friendly format again took into account the 
importance of communication between two communities accused of deafness (Brad-
ley and Nixon 2009). In many respects, this initiative shows signs of learning from 
some of the earlier lessons. WP8 provided the opportunity for new and imagina-
tive research, and the study referred to above building on nudges is a nice example, 
where the research was able to develop in accordance with emerging findings. WP5 
has furnished much-needed guidance on improving economic evaluation.
It is not all good news however. The joint funding arrangements between the 
ESRC and the College of Policing, at least initially, caused some problems. The 
budgets were not flexible enough to allow a change of course mid-programme in 
relation to experience gained. The methodology was tightly specified for work pack-
age 1 although it was possible to take a broader view of the nature of acceptable 
evidence in carrying out work package 2. The tools for translating research into 
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practice were initially meant to focus upon effect size and cost and considerable dis-
cussion and persuasion was involved in changing this remit and allowing the devel-
opment of EMMIE. Similarly, it was determined at a very early stage in the process 
that the final toolkit would be initiative based rather than problem based. This was a 
judgement call. In opting for initiatives, as was done, the College was following the 
tendency in the other what works centres of the time, to do so. Several members of 
the research team felt this was a mistake, arguing that the police (and others with a 
concern for crime prevention and community safety) are more interested in asking, 
‘how can I solve this problem effectively and ethically?’, rather than ‘does this ini-
tiative work?’. There were consequences of this decision for the process of negotiat-
ing topics for new reviews under work package 2 with, for example, the police say-
ing that they wanted to know what to do about organised crime (a problem) which 
then had to be translated by the research team into an initiative (asset management 
was chosen) despite the fact that none of the evaluations of asset management were 
judged against reducing organised crime. Insofar as they had an ‘outcome’ it related 
to the amount of assets seized. WP8 shows the advantage of leaving scope for devel-
opment within a research project. This kind of flexibility is important if research is 
to deliver good evidence.
Furthermore, although the structural proximity of the WWCCR to the College 
of Policing had the major advantage of increasing the likelihood of and ease with 
which the results of the work might be incorporated into police training (supported 
by work packages 6 and 7), the disadvantage is that the toolkit (and indeed the Cen-
tre) are closely associated with the police and as such are not naturally turned to by 
those in other agencies that have a responsibility or interest in crime prevention such 
as the probation and prison services, courts, local authorities, other public sector 
agencies and of course the private sector.
Notwithstanding these potential drawbacks, and they are not intended to be seen 
here as critical of the decisions made, which were themselves complex and called 
for some difficult judgements (there was little by way of evidence to support one 
option over another) the toolkit itself is increasingly becoming a source of refer-
ence. The College of Policing report that between February 2015 and June 2018, the 
toolkit and its associated pages have been viewed 188,251 times, with over 35,000 
from January to June 2018. This is over 10,000 more views than the same period in 
2017 and 17,000 more views than the same period in 2016. It has also been viewed 
from 18 major cities worldwide covering 12 countries.
Conclusion: assessment of progress and lessons learned
Since at least the 1980s, there have been attempts to increase the crime preven-
tion knowledge base and integrate that knowledge into routine practice. In the 
past 20 years, the CRP and WWCCR comprise two major recent examples in the 
UK. The US report to Congress produced just over 20 years ago was an important 
forerunner (Sherman et  al. 1997). The Campbell Collaboration stands as a global 
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movement also to bring robust evidence to policy and practice, including that related 
to crime.
The CRP promised much by way both of developing new knowledge on ways to 
prevent crime and on getting established knowledge acted on where it was needed. 
We have seen that it failed—a missed opportunity.
The evidence from surveys associated with work packages 6 and 9 from the What 
Works programme in Crime Prevention demonstrate that even within policing, 
where efforts to foster routine attention to relevant research evidence have been sub-
stantial in Britain, there seems to have been quite limited penetration.
Does this matter? Crime has fallen dramatically in the UK, as in most other west-
ern countries, over the past 20–30 years (Tseloni et al. 2010). Figure 1 shows the 
trend overall for England and Wales. The global falls seem to have much more to do 
with the use of security measures than police action (Farrell et al. 2014).
The police are traditionally seen as responsible for crime prevention, albeit their 
ability directly do so is very limited (Laycock and Tilley 1995). For the most part 
others have played and are likely in the future to play a much larger part in the pre-
vention of crime. Several of those who are competent in Engstad and Evans’ terms 
have assumed some responsibility and that assumption of responsibility at least in 
some cases has followed research-based action putting pressure on them (Engstad 
and Evans 1980). The improvement in the security of cars following the research-
based Car Theft Index, which revealed the makes and models most stolen, is a case 
in point (Laycock 2004). Indeed, the whole process of responsibilisation, whereby 
those competent to prevent crime are encouraged to assume some responsibility, 
may be much more significant for crime prevention both in the UK and elsewhere 
than getting relevant local decision-makers to have a detailed understanding of the 
knowledge base (Tilley 2018). The arrival of cyber crime as a major problem is 
much more likely to be effectively addressed by those in the IT industry than public 
service practitioners.
Notwithstanding recognition that the police (and for that matter others in the 
criminal justice system) lack the competence directly to do much that has the poten-
tial to prevent many crimes, it remains the case that the police (and other parts of 
the criminal justice system) continue widely to be deemed to have primary respon-
sibility for crime prevention. Moreover, in local conditions, they are well placed to 
understand local crime and community safety problems and to advise (and mobilise) 
others who are competent to act but may be reluctant to do so. For this, the police do 
need a secure knowledge base, relating to the analysis of crime problems for preven-
tive purposes, and measures that may be taken to reduce those problems.
Crime problems are notoriously ‘wicked’. They tend to be complex and the abil-
ity to do something is in the hands of many, most of whom have other priorities. 
They are also often open to many different kinds of approach. There is a pretty wide-
spread consensus on this. Knowing what others need to do and getting them to do 
it is a major challenge for which responsible bodies need to be prepared. We have 
come to understand better the strategies that the police can use to persuade others 
to act in ways that will prevent crime even when they may not be minded to do so 
(Scott and Goldstein 2005).
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Notwithstanding the limits on what they can do directly, the police remain a 
dedicated service whose main remit ever since Robert Peel has been the preven-
tion of crime. This makes the CoP a natural hub for knowledge assembly (as in the 
WWCCR) and dissemination. It also makes the police the most obvious professional 
group to be bearers, users and purveyors of that knowledge, even where this needs 
to be acted on by third parties. Moreover, although we have been stressing in this 
conclusion the limits to what the police can do directly to prevent crime, they can 
certainly do a lot and there is growing evidence for what they can do, relating in 
particular to patrols targeted on hot spots (Sherman et al. 2014) and focussed deter-
rence (Kennedy et al. 2017). In both of these examples, theory and evidence have 
marched hand in hand as with the CopCat work referred to earlier, in all cases with 
much more to learn.
It remains to be seen how well CoP perform their roles in relation to the police 
and third parties. They face tough challenges both in embedding attention to research 
and evidence in a police body orientated to using it imaginatively in addressing local 
crime and community safety problems.
The efforts of CoP to kick start police-university partnerships appear to be a fur-
ther step in the right direction (see Crawford 2014). Moreover, the spread of the 
rhetoric of ‘evidence-based policing’ and the formation in the UK (as well as many 
other countries) of Societies of Evidence-Based Policing may again be helping to 
create a climate where research and evidence are brought to bear routinely in policy 
and practice.
It might be argued that both the CRP and the WWCCR embody an unduly tech-
nicist approach to controlling crime. Indeed a recent chapter has referred somewhat 
disparagingly to an ‘evidence-based variant of epistemic crime control’ (Loader and 
Sparks 2017: 110) that ‘neglect(s) the normative force of democratic procedures’ 
(ibid: 111). The text goes on to aver that, ‘In this respect, epistemic crime control 
risks becoming a form of technological governance that shuts down the space of 
public deliberation around crime by turning it into a terrain of competent knowledge, 
one which prioritises the search for order over uncertainties of democratic freedom.’ 
(ibid). However, this bleak possibility is by no means entailed by evidence. Indeed, 
absent the painstaking, technically challenging and complex work of assembling, 
interpreting and analysing evidence relating to crime, deliberation on the control of 
crime will tend to turn on assumptions that are simply mistaken.
In practice, science itself comes close to exemplifying deliberative democracy, 
as conjectured in theoretical accounts and revealed in empirical study of the con-
duct of science (see Merton 1973; Collins 2017; Collins and Evans 2017). But the 
conditions for the production of science and associated technologies are very par-
ticular. We know of no-one concerned with bringing evidence to crime control who 
would wish to eschew democratic deliberation, nor is its exclusion either implicitly 
or explicitly implied. The methods of effective control that are identified are open to 
use in alternative political agendas (see Tilley 2016).
It would seem unwise to exclude evidence from public discussion, to eschew 
its careful collection, assessment and analysis, and to neglect findings that have 
survived the deliberative processes in the formation of scientific understanding 
of crime. None of this makes science infallible or the sole focus for democratic 
 N. Tilley, G. Laycock 
discussion. However, as Harry Collins and Robert Evans have stressed democra-
cies need science to emulate its methods and take account of its findings (Collins 
and Evans 2017). In this sense, whatever their practical flaws, both the CRP and the 
WWCCR have been welcome moves within the past 20 years, as is the case with 
cognate developments in other countries, especially where they reveal, rather than 
skate over, the complexities and contingencies involved in producing and applying 
the evidence. Distaining science, repudiating technical expertise, and embracing 
ignorance in our view does democracy and democratic discussion few favours!
Let us hope that in 20 years time we can look back on a golden period of effec-
tive, ethical and informed strategies to maintain a low crime, high community safety 
world.
Acknowledgements This paper draws on the ‘What Works Commissioned Partnership Programme: 
“University Consortium for Evidence-Based Crime Reduction”’, funded by the Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC) Grant ES/L007223/1 and the College of Policing.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Inter-
national License (http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribu-
tion, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and 
the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Bradley, D., and C. Nixon. 2009. Ending the ‘Dialogue of the Deaf’: Evidence and Policing Policies and 
Practices. An Australian Case Study. Police Practice and Research 10(5–6): 423–435.
Collins, H. 2017. Gravity’s Kiss: The Detection of Gravitational Waves. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Collins, H., and R. Evans. 2017. Why Democracies Need Science. Cambridge: Polity.
Crawford, A. 2014. Research co-production and knowledge mobilisation in policing: Some insights from 
innovations in police-university collaboration. In Applied Police Research: Challenges and Oppor-
tunities, ed. E. Cockbain and J. Knutsson. Abingdon: Routledge. (Crime Science Series ISBN 
978-0-415-74132-3).
Engstad, P., and J. Evans. 1980. Responsibility, Competence and Police Effectiveness in Crime Control. 
In The Effectiveness of Policing, ed. R. Clarke and J. Hough. Gower: Farnborough.
Farrell, G., N. Tilley, and A. Tseloni. 2014. Why the Crime Drop? Crime and Justice 43: 421–490.
Gilling, D. 1994. Multi-agency Crime Prevention in Britain: The Problem of Combining Situational and 
Social Strategies. Crime Prevention Studies 3: 231–248.
Goldblatt, P., and C. Lewis. 1998. Reducing Offending: An Assessment of the Research Evidence on Ways 
of Dealing with Offending Behaviour, vol. 187. London: Home Office. (Home Office Research 
Study).
Halpern, D. 2018. Foreword in The What Works Team (2018), p. 4.
Homel, P., S. Nutley, B. Webb, and N. Tilley. 2004. Investing to Deliver: Reviewing the Implementation 
of the UK Crime Reduction Programme, vol. 281. London: Home Office. (Home Office Research 
Study ).
Hope, T. 2004. Pretend it Works: Evidence and Governance in the Evaluation of the Home Office Crime 
Reduction Programme. Criminal Justice 4(3): 287–308.
Hough, M. 2004. Modernisation, Scientific Rationalism and the Crime Reduction Programme. Criminal 
Justice 4(3): 239–253.
Johnson, S., N. Tilley, and K. Bowers. 2015. Introducing EMMIE: An Evidence Rating Scale for Crime 
Prevention Policy and Practice. Journal of Experimental Criminology. 11(3): 459–473.
Kennedy, D.M., M.A. Kleiman, and A.A. Braga. 2017. Beyond deterrence. In Handbook of Crime Pre-
vention and Community Safety, ed. N. Tilley and A. Sidebottom. London: Routledge.
Developing a knowledge base for crime prevention: lessons…
Laycock, G. 2004. The UK Car Theft Index: An Example of Government Leverage. In Understanding 
and Preventing Car Theft, ed. M. Maxfield and R. Clarke, 25–44. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice 
Press.
Laycock, G.K., and N. Tilley. 1995. Implementing Crime Prevention Programs. In Building a Safer Soci-
ety: Crime and Justice, A Review of Research, vol. 19, ed. M. Tonry and D. Farrington, 535–584. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Laycock, G., and B. Webb. 2003. Conclusions—The Role of the Centre. In Crime Reduction and Prob-
lem-Oriented Policing, ed. K. Bullock and N. Tilley, 285–301. Devon: Cullompton.
Loader, I., and R. Sparks. 2017. Penal Populism and Epistemic Crime Control. In The Oxford Handbook 
of Criminology, ed. A. Liebling, S. Maruna and L. McAra, 57–76. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Maguire, M. 2004. The Crime Reduction Programme in England and Wales: Reflections on the Vision 
and the Reality. Criminal Justice 4(3): 213–237.
Manning, M., S. Johnson, N. Tilley, G. Wong, and M. Vorsina. 2016. Economic Analysis and Efficiency 
in Policing, Criminal Justice and Crime Reduction: What Works?. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Mawby, R. 1999. Introducing the Journal. Crime Prevention and Community Safety 1(1): 7–9.
Merton, R. 1973. The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations. Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press. (especially Part 3, and Chapter 13 in particular).
Pawson, R. 2006. Evidence-Based Policy: A Realist Perspective. London: Sage.
Pawson, R., and N. Tilley. 1997. Realistic Evaluation. London: Sage.
Raynor, P. 2004. The Probation Service “Pathfinders”: Find the Path and Losing the Way. Criminal Jus-
tice 4(3): 309–325.
Scott, M.S., and H. Goldstein. 2005. Shifting and Sharing Responsibility for Public Safety Problems. 
Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.
Sherman, L., D. Gottfredson, D. Mackenzie, J. Eck, P. Reuter, and S. Bushway. 1997. Preventing Crime: 
What Works, What doesn’t and What’s Promising?. Washington, DC: Office of Justice Programs.
Sherman, L.W., S. Williams, B. Ariel, L.R. Strang, N. Wain, M. Slothower, and A. Norton. 2014. An 
Integrated Theory of Hot Spots Patrol Strategy: Implementing Prevention by Scaling Up and Feed-
ing Back. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 30(2): 95–122.
Sidebottom, A., A. Thornton, L. Tompson, J. Belur, N. Tilley, and K. Bowers. 2017. A Systematic 
Review of Tagging as a Method to Reduce Theft in Retail Environments. Crime Science 6: 7.
Sidebottom, A., L. Tompson, A. Thornton, K. Bullock, N. Tilley, K. Bowers, and S. Johnson. 2018. Gat-
ing Alleys to Reduce Crime: A Meta-analysis and Realist Synthesis. Justice Quarterly 35(1): 55–86.
Stanko, E. 2004. Reviewing the Evidence of Hate: Lessons from a Project under the Home Office Crime 
Reduction Programme. Criminal Justice 4(3): 277–286.
Thaler, R.H., and C.R. Sunstein. 2009. Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happi-
ness. London: Penguin Books.
The What Works Team. 2018. The What Works Network Five Years On https ://asset s.publi shing .servi 
ce.gov.uk/gover nment /uploa ds/syste m/uploa ds/attac hment _data/file/67747 8/6.4154_What_works 
_repor t_Final .pdf. Accessed 26 Sept 2018.
Tilley, N. 2004. Applying Theory-Driven Evaluation to the British Crime Reduction Programme. Crimi-
nal Justice 4(3): 255–276.
Tilley, N. 2016. Middle Range Radical Realism for Crime Prevention. In What is to be Done About Crime 
and Punishment Towards a “Public Criminology”, ed. R. Matthews, 89–122. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Tilley, N. 2018. Privatising Crime Control. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sci-
ence 679: 55–71.
Tseloni, A., J. Mailley, G. Farrell, and N. Tilley. 2010. The Cross-National Crime and Repeat Victimi-
zation Trend for Main Crime Categories: Multilevel Modeling of the International Crime Victims 
Survey. European Journal of Criminology 7(5): 375–394.
UPSI. 2018. Behavioural Crime Prevention: Using Nudges, Tugs and Teachable Moments in Crime 
Prevention Communications. 60 Second Briefing. Cardiff University: Universities’ Police Science 
Institute.
